Relatively few databases are accessible over the Internet. With today's technology one would like to encapsulate a database and make it available over the Internet. A client using such databases would browse an old census database, look-up for references in an object-oriented database system, access descriptions and pictures over the Internet, or combine di erent information using NCSA Mosaic, WWW, or back-end databases.
fective searching, updating and combining of information in distributed and heterogeneous environment. The DOK system is based on CORBA Common Object Request Broker 1 technology, the distributed-object standard developed by the OMG Object Management Group, to communicate across different database platforms. In addition, DOK provides federated services allowing clients to use multiple databases in combination, and these involve query service 5 , reengineering service 6 , and re ection service. Other services, such a s trader and transaction services, are currently under development.
Our experience indicates that security issues are required to be considered at the beginning of the design of any element of a federated environment. In this paper we describe the main elements of the DOK system which allow the enforcement of federated security policies in the context of autonomous, distributed and heterogeneous databases. DOK uses security agents to maintain a DOK federation in a secure state. Di erent t ypes of security agents are involved in the enforcement of security policies. Coordination agents are responsible for managing the whole federation and delegate functions to a more speci c agents, called task agents. By delegating the access of information of local databases to database agents, task agents are able to control any access to a federation by using speci c designed security procedures.
Background and Overview of the DOK Project
Database security is concerned with ensuring privacy, secrecy, i n tegrity and availability o f stored data. This issue is often discussed in terms of the need to restrict access to stored information in databases, and is called access control. Only authorised users with appropriate security clearance are allowed to access, view, and update data. Due to the rapid growth in data communications technology, databases have e v olved from being central repositories of data to distributed ones in which their services are advertised through a broker. The OMG ORB Object Request Broker 1 is an example of a broker which provides client server communication across di erent hardware and software platforms. Security problems associated with databases have e v olved accordingly, and whilst the basic needs to e ectively provide a secure database remains the same, the nature of the problems to be addressed has become increasingly complex. A considerable amount o f w ork has been devoted to address database security in centralised databases, e.g. 3 . However, less e ort has been devoted to the provision of security in distributed environments.
The research performed in the context of the DOK project gives appropriate solutions to the problems related to the enforcement of local and federated security policies in distributed and heterogeneous environments. The DOK system provides i a GAC access control 8 allowing an homogeneous description of local security policies and ii a framework 7 to express and enforce federated security policies using state transition diagrams. Before we introduce some details about the security issues in the DOK system, we rst give a n o v erview of this system. In a simple way, DOK can be seen as a set of federated services which are made available for user through the Internet. These services allow users to access, update or combine data located in di erent databases of a federation. The DOK system also supports multiple federations, where each of them is managed by a DOK Manager and a set of wrappers. These are designed as intelligent agents which control other specialised agents which provide the basic services of a federation, such u s query service 5 , reengineering service 6 , and reflective service.
For a user of a federation, information is modelled as objects" i.e., as abstract entities. The particularity of these objects is that they are de ned from other objects of either a single or multiple federations. They appear to users as physical objects eventhough they are virtual. The DOK underlying model supports the construction of such objects, which contrarily to ordinary objects that are physically stored in local databases, store only references to physical objects 9 .
In order to support a secure access to virtual objects, the DOK model is extended to include security information. We designed a federated access control, called GAC Global Access Control 8 , allowing the computation and the assignment of a federated access list to each virtual object. This list is built for each user of a federation and speci es the set of basic transactions he she is allowed to perform e.g. rw, :rw, r:w and :r:w on a virtual object. The federated access lists are built by re-engineering security information embedded within local databases. Since an aggregate of a virtual object can be located in many local databases, we provided speci c rules and procedures allowing the translation and integration of security information into the federated level.
In addition to the GAC model, we h a v e designed a DOK secure architecture. This has three layers, including a coordination layer, task layer and database layer. Each of these layers contains specialised agents that enforce a certain part of the federated security policies. Coordination tasks e.g., nding appropriate agent to process a certain request are performed by agents such as the DOK Manager. The enforcement of the security tasks e.g., constraint maintenance delegated by the DOK Manager are performed by s p e -cialised agents such as the Constraint Manager. Finally, the database functions e.g., retrieval of information about a speci c user are performed by the User and Data agents.
One of the important DOK security agents is the Constraint Manager. This manager deals with the aggregation problem 7 in the context of federated environments. It builds state transition diagrams for the global constraints to specify the di erent computation states of constraints. These states are checked by the Constraint Manager and appropriate procedures are triggered when any of these constraints is violated.
The DOK Architecture
As mentioned earlier in this paper, DOK 9 i s a system providing federated services. Each o f these services is implemented as a server in a federation and is used by di erent users to perform speci c functions. Each server involves a set of specialised intelligent agents 2 which are responsible either to keep track about what is happening in a federation or to perform speci c tasks in behalf of other agents. The details about the agent model and the communication between agents are described in the rest of this paper.
The Agent Model
Basically, a DOK agent refers to an active entity which can perform speci c tasks within a federation such as enforcing security, ensuring the committing of global transactions, mining resources or optimising global queries. An agent is graphically denoted with a circle icon as shown in Figure 1 . It contains information, such as the name and the identity of the agent, a set of properties. A property m a y represent either information which is required during the enforcement of security policies or security procedures themselves.
The communication between agents is based on the di erent relationships which exist amongst them. The stronger a relationship between two agents, the bigger is the communication between them. Our agent model supports three types of communication relationships: containment relationship and association relationship, inheritance r elationship. These relationships are supported by most of objectoriented models 4 , however the relationships between agents are related to dynamic issues e.g., communication between agents rather than static issues e.g., properties of agents. More importantly, these introduced relationships are close to those that exist between humans. In this way, containment relationships are parental relationships allowing the expression of a relationship between a father mother and his her children. The association relationships is more-or-less like neighbourhood relationships. They express some sort of relationships between human agents; however, they are weaker than containment relationships. Inheritance relationships express more a kind of specialisation of human agents to perform a speci c tasks. An example of such a relationship is be for instance the relationships between a sta and teacher or administrator agents. A sta agent is a generic agent which can perform some generic functions e.g., communication with other sta agents, and a teacher agent is a specialised agent o f s p ecialised sta agent which perform speci c activities e.g., teaching in the same way a n a dministrator agent is specialised in performing administrative w ork.
Let us now i n troduce some details about the relationships between agents, however this time based on those agents which are responsible for the enforcement of security procedures. As previously stated, a containment relationship describes the fact that an agent, called father agent, contains other agents, called child agents, which are specialised in the processing of the functions of their father agent. Figure 1 shows the father agent DOK Manager having containment relationships to the children agents Global Transaction Manager, Global Security Processor and Query Query Manager. These relationships show that some of the DOK functions can be delegated by the DOK Manager to its children. The functions of the child agents relate for example to the management of federated transactions and queries, and to the enforcement of federated security policies. The DOK Manager acts as an agent which communicates with other agents. When a DOK Manager receives a request from a User agent, this manager identi es the appropriate child agents which are concerned with processing of the request and then performs a delegation.
The containment relationships between a father agent and its children agents can be quali ed as strong relationships". The weaker relationships" are modelled as associations. They also express dependencies between agents, however they relate to a mutual collaboration between agents in order to perform one or multiple common functions. Referring again to Figure 1 , the association relationship between the DOK Manager and the Wrapper agent represents a sort of collaboration in which one of these agents can request for example to transform a schema of a given database in order to be understood by the different agents of a federation. Agents manipulate data which are only in the form of objects 4 . In this way, a relational schema will be transformed into an object-oriented schema by using one of the function of the wrapper proposed in 6 . Note that the Wrapper agent m a y communicate with the DOK Manager and requests for instance some of its services.
The last relationship is the inheritance r elationship between agents. The schema of Figure 1 does not have one, however a simple example of such relationship can be de ned between the Wrapper agent and another new agent which will model the Wrapper for a speci c database, e.g. Oracle database. We call this new agent OracleWrapper agent, and this will be like a n y other wrapper in the sense that it can perform any of the functions of an ordinary wrapper. The di erences with the other wrapper agents is that WrapperOracle is specialised in managing Oracle databases, that is it can only translate schemata de ned using an Oracle database management system.
Security Agents
As for any other functions of the DOK system, the enforcement of security policies by the DOK agents is a multi-level process. At the top level, the DOK Manager or Wrapper agents depending on the level of the security checking identify the type of task to perform in a federation e.g., authentication of user agents. The agents of this top level are aware of all the activities which are happening or have already happened in a federation. In order to know who is doing what", information about di erent agents is stored in a special catalog. Based on this information, the agents of the top layer, called delegation agents, delegate functions to the appropriate agents.
At the middle level, speci c functions such as enforcement of global constraints or the sanitisation of query results are performed by what we call security agents. Examples of such agents are the Global Security Processor or Constraint Manager of Figure 1 . The main di erence between coordination agents and security agents is that the later are spe-
The bottom level comprises a set of agents specialised in accessing or updating information required by agents of higher layers. These agents are database-like agents playing a role of interface between the participating databases and the agents of top and middle layers. They are called data agents.
An example of such agents is the User agent which records all information about a particular user, including the di erent access rights that he she has for di erent objects as well as the identity of the user.
This DOK three-layered architecture has some few advantages. It is a clean" architecture in the sense that each l a y er contains only agents which are responsible for a certain activities of a federation. As for human being, these activities can be management activities, that is they are performed by coordination agents which will supervise the running of a federation. Other activities will be for example those which relate to a speci c task. These activities are performed by specialised agents. In this way, specialised agents have a narrow view of the whole system. The last activity will concern more simpler functions which are related to the preparation" of data to be used either by security or coordination agents. Finally, the above classi cation of agents, which is based on the agent activities in a federation, induces a sort of a logical layering of the DOK system. As shown in Figure 2 , each layer contains a set of clusters describing some of the main activities of the DOK system.
Coordination Layer
This level involves a set of agents specialised in the coordination of the whole activities of a federation. With regard to the security enforcement function, the DOK Manager and the Wrapper agent are the only agents which h a v e an overall understanding on how t o k eep a federation in a secure state. When a query is sent to a local database, the wrapper authenticates the user agent and determines whether the query is related to the local database or to the federation. If it is a local query, the wrapper will delegate the processing to the local database. Otherwise, the query is translated from a language used at the local level into a global level 6 and then processed by the the DOK Manager.
Wrapper Agent
The role of this agent is to translate the query information from the local level to the global level and vice versa. This will allow the DOK Manager and other agents to have a better understanding of information contained within local databases. In terms of security enforcement, a Wrapper agent is responsible for authenticating local user agents to the global level before presenting the query. A wrapper checks the security attributes of the user, and relays them to the DOK Manager for enforcement of global security policies. This is depicted by the Component Database, User and Data agents, and the relationships among these agents see Figure 1 
Checks whether a user agent can access individual aggregates speci ed in the query. At this level, the GAC model and algorithms proposed in 8 are used to generate the federated access list for each aggregate of a virtual object.
The procedures generate access list and integrate access right are triggered by the Wrapper agent as a response to a request of the DOK Manager. The generated access lists are then integrated to become the federated access list of the aggregate. The DOK system will grant o r deny access or update of the information to the user agent according to the federated access list. When a user agent is e ectively allowed to access or update individual aggregates speci ed in a query, the second step of the query processing consists of checking whether or not the user agent is allowed to combine aggregates to derive information denied to him her. At this stage of the pre-processing of the query, the DOK Manager will delegate the enforcement o f the aggregation constraints to the Constraint Manager which will look for all types of constraints related to the corresponding user agent. When a set of constraints are found, the query is re-written by the Query Modi er to include the constraints within the query see Figure 3. 
Task Layer
Agents of this layer are responsible for performing speci c tasks to ensure that all the aspects of security processing are carried out properly to maintain global security. The tasks of maintaining federated security policies are delegated by the DOK manager to specialised agents such a s t h e Global Security Processor, Constraint Manager, Query Modi er,
Global Security Processor
The main role of this agent is to assist the DOK Manager in enforcing federated security policies. As shown in Figure 3 , it does this via methods such a s check constraints and sanitise query results. The method check constraints preprocesses, where possible, the security aspects of a global query before they are sent out to the a ected sites for execution. This does not include constraints dependent on the result of the query, such as constraints restricting the number of instances of an object or facet that a subject is allowed to retrieve i n a query. We n o w describe the two main procedures of the Global Security Processor agent. The procedure check constraints is responsible for enforcing the constraints established in the federation. The checking of constraints is performed by searching for all the constraints affected by the query. This is delegated to the Constraint Manager which returns a set of constraints concerned with the user's query. The set of candidate constraints is then processed to determine all the constraints that are totally or partially violated by the query. This processing is performed by the procedure process constraints of the Constraint Manager.
The other function of the Global Security Processor is to sanitise the query result, after the evaluation of the query. The corresponding procedure sanitise query results searches through the Constraint manager for speci c constraints. This procedure of sanitisation is a re nement of the above function check constraint to deal with speci c types of constraints.
The processing of both general and more speci c constraints i.e. those that are concerned with the sanitisation of query results is performed in the same way, i.e. polymorphic for all type of constraints. The only di erence between the procedure that checks a set of constraints and the one that sanitises a query result is the selection of appropriate constraints at the processing stage.
Constraint Manager
The role of this agent is to enforce aggregation constraints. These specify the access rights of user agents to aggregate data of di erent databases. The following are the main functions which are associated to the Constraint Manager: search constraints, search quantity constraints and process constraints. The rst two procedures involve retrieval of constraints from the constraint database which are related to both the query and user agent. The third procedure performs a validation of the selected set constraints that has been returned by the procedures search constraints, search quantity constraints. Our focus here will be on the procedure process constraints.
The DOK approach for enforcing aggregation constraints 7 can be summarised as follows. Firstly, from a set of constraints that has been returned by the procedure search constraints, the Constraint Manager performs a sorting of the set for better global enforcement. This ordering is performed according to statistics related to each constraint e.g., set of objects concerned with the constraint. For each aggregation constraint i n the ordered set, the Constraint Manager builds what we call a state transition diagram which speci es all the required sub-computations for enforcing the constraint. The construction of this diagram is done by analysing the di erent parts of the aggregation constraint to detect inconsistencies. For example, an aggregation constraint m a y stipulate that the user agent u can never aggregate the attributes salary and name. The state transition of this constraint will have three main nodes as shown in Figure salary. Thus, our approach for enforcing federated security policies using state transition diagrams is a more general approach than existing ones. It deals with a general form of constraints, and takes into account both past and the present states.
Database Layer
This level concerns the lower level agents of the DOK system, which provide database-based information, such as the list of user agents that can access a given object or facet. These agents are the Component Database agent, User agent and Data agent see Figure 1 . A user agent can have a zero relationship with a component database, meaning that the user agent has not registered with the database, or a one to one relationship with a component database in which the user agent is allowed to query that database. The database agents record the access rights a user agent has in a global query. F or instance, if a site uses DAC each facet has an ACL Access Control List stating the user's rights for access to the facet. Similarly a user agent will be granted access to data in a MAC database according to the multilevel security policy of the local site.
Conclusion
Although the main issues on database security still focus on proper identi cation and authorisation, the complexity has rapidly grown with the rapid evolution in database technology. At the beginning of database development, security issues were mainly concerned with centralised database environments. As database technology progressed, the complexity of security issues also grew progressively. As such, the nature of the solutions o ered also improved accordingly. As the focus of today's database technology is to achieve i n teroperability of database systems, related security issues become exceedingly complex. Although many research e orts aim at providing secure cooperation among databases most of the solutions o ered are limited to a particular database model or particular types of database models.
The proposed DOK solution allow databases to be used in the Internet in a secure way. Security agents are designed to detect any violation of both local and federated security policies. Although in this paper we present its security aspect only, DOK actually encompasses a wide range of database processing aspects, and is well suited for the development of a federated environment. Details about these aspects as well as the DOK project can be found at the following URL: http: www.cs.rmit.edu.au zahirt dok.html.
